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RETHINKING "INSURANCE," ESPECIALLY AFTER AIG
BOBBY L. DEXTERt
INTRODUCTION
In order to qualify as an "insurance company" for federal income
tax purposes, both life insurance companies and their property and casu-
alty counterparts must clear the hurdle of Section 816(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code ("the Code").' That section clarifies that insurance com-
pany status follows only if more than half of the entity's business is the
issuance of insurance or annuity contracts.2 Although neither the Code
nor the Treasury Regulations define "insurance," 3 longstanding common
law doctrine dictates that an arrangement will constitute insurance only if
it incorporates requisite risk shifting and risk distribution.4 A life insur-
ance policyholder, for example, typically shifts the financial risk of his
untimely demise to an insurance company by paying premiums.5 In turn,
the life insurance company broadly distributes that risk by collecting
premiums from a large population of policyholders 6 so that any claims
presented will not present a financial challenge to the company relative
to the aggregate premiums received and set aside for claim payments.7 In
t Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Yale University,
1989; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992. 1 would like to thank Chapman University School of Law for
providing research support for this article and my faculty colleagues for offering comments and
suggestions during the presentation of this work. Thanks are also in order for comments from par-
ticipants attending the Southern California Junior Law Faculty Workshop held at Pepperdine School
of Law, the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association, and the 2009 Junior Tax
Scholars Workshop held at Brooklyn Law School.
1. See I.R.C. § 816(a) (2006). With respect to property and casualty companies subject to tax
under § 831, section 831(c) indicates that "insurance company" under § 831 has the same meaning
as that set forth in § 816(a). I.R.C. § 83 1(c) (2006).
2. See § 816(a). A company may also qualify by reinsuring risks underwritten by other
insurance companies. See id.
3. See Rev. Rul. 2005-40,2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557.
4. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) ("Historically and commonly insur-
ance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.").
5. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Shifting
risk entails the transfer of the impact of a potential loss from the insured to the insurer. If the insured
has shifted its risk to the insurer, then a loss by or a claim against the insured does not affect it be-
cause the loss is offset by the proceeds of an insurance payment."); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v.
Comm'r, 43 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir. 1930) (noting that the taxpayer would have shifted the risk had it
paid the premium).
6. See Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1300 ("Insuring many independent risks in
return for numerous premiums serves to distribute risk.").
7. See id. As an interesting historical aside, several of the initial founders of the North Caro-
lina Mutual Life Insurance Company (which currently has insurance in force exceeding $12 billion
and is the oldest and largest historically African-American-owned life insurance company in the
United States, see N.C. Mut. Life Ins. Co., http://www.ncmutuallife.com/newsite/pages/about.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009)) had to pool their own funds after a quick meeting in the rear of a barber
shop in order to pay the $40 death benefit claim of a widow. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN BUsINESS 519 (Jessie Carney Smith ed., 2006).
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adopting that approach, the company takes advantage of the so-called
"law of large numbers." Using reliable probability data, it can generally
coordinate premium receipts with predicted losses. With a population of
policyholders in a life insurance pool sufficiently large and varied, pre-
dicted mortality rates will roughly correlate with the population's actual
mortality rates, 9 and the company can generally pay benefits as they
come due over the long term without going broke in the short term.'
0
For many companies, satisfying the qualitative and quantitative "in-
surance" standards presents no problem. Accordingly, the company does
not question its status as an insurance company. Logically, those policy-
holders entitled to deduct premiums paid to insurance companies as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses also have no reason to question the
tax deductibility of the payments made." Historically, however, there are
prominent victims of the risk shifting/distributing standard, entities
known in the business world as "captive" insurance companies. 12 Gener-
ally speaking, a captive insurance company (which is routinely organized
and operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent entity) is often
created to provide coverage to a business that cannot secure the insur-
ance it needs from the marketplace, or can only secure such insurance at
a prohibitive cost' 3 (for example, a company operating nuclear reactors
in an urban area and needing insurance against the risk of a meltdown).
Legitimate business needs notwithstanding, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS" or "Service") has long been hostile to the notion that a wholly-
owned subsidiary can insure its parent company' 4 and, accordingly, that
the payment of a premium from a parent to its captive insurer subsidiary
qualifies as a deductible ordinary and necessary business expense. At-
tempts to resolve this issue have, not surprisingly, resulted in substantial
judicial activity, a series of IRS pronouncements, and a healthy body of
professional and scholarly commentary.' 5 For some time, the Service
8. See Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1300.
9. See id. (linking the law of large numbers, a statistical phenomenon, and the concept of risk
distribution).
10. See id. ("Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly
claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set aside for the payment of such a claim..
• By assuming numerous relatively small, independent risks that occur randomly over time, the
insurer smoothes out losses to match more closely its receipt of premiums.").
11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993) ("Among the items included in busi-
ness expenses are ... insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses
in the case of a business .... ").
12. For a basic definition of "captive insurance company," see Gordon A. Schaller & Scott A
Harshman, Use of Captive Insurance Companies in Estate Planning, 33 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS.
J. 252, 252 (2008). Application of the traditional "insurance" test to captive insurance companies is
discussed in Part II of this Article.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by Rev. Rul.
2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232. As discussed in greater detail in Part 11, the prior
ruling concluded, inter alia, that a parent had not entered into an insurance relationship with its
wholly-owned insurance subsidiary.
15. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 840-43 (6th Cir. 1995); Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1153-54 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amerco, Inc.
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reasoned that a premium payment from one related entity to another in its
affiliated or consolidated group for insurance simply did not shift any
risk because, in the end, the financial burden of loss coverage did not
leave "the economic family."' 16 Without risk shifting, no insurance ar-
rangement existed, and a tax deduction for a premium payment from the
entity to its fellow group member was deemed inappropriate. 7 Even in
the wake of judicial attack 18 and scholarly criticism, 19 the Service persis-
tently appeals to traditional risk shifting and risk distributing standards
with regard to the tax deductibility of insurance premium payments.20
Whether stating its opposition to a given arrangement under the ru-
bric of risk shifting/distributing or "economic family," the Service seeks,
at root, to prevent the taking of a deduction for what it sees as merely a
contribution to a contingency reserve. Its opposition is not unwavering
v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 164, 168 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342
(9th Cir. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Humana,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1989); Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811
F.2d 1297, 1305-07 (9th Cir. 1987); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922-23
(10th Cir. 1986); Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Hosp. Corp. of
Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1997 WL 663283, at *30, *35 (1997);
Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 56-58 (1997), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.
1010, 1025-29 (1987); Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40,
2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557; Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; Rev.
Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573,
obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-
028 (June 14, 1996), 1996 WL 326435; James A. Christopherson, The Captive Medical Malpractice
Insurance Company Alternative, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 125-32 (1996); Karen Gantt, Federal
Tax Treatment of Medical Malpractice Insurance Alternatives for Nonprofits, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
495, 514-21 (2004); Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Disregarding the Separate Corporate Entity
of Captive Insurance Companies: A Violation of the Moline Properties Doctrine, 14 J. CORP. L. 399,
405-09 (1989); Robert W. Minto, Jr., Captives and RRG'S in the Reinsurance Environment, 889
PLI/CoMM 837, 843-44 (2006); Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 254-58; F. Roy Sedore,
Insurance Premium Deductibility, 779 PLI/TAX 1061, 1067-69 (2007); Stuart R. Singer, When the
Internal Revenue Service Abuses the System: Captive Insurance Companies and the Delusion of the
Economic Family, 10 VA. TAX REV. 113, 160-63 (1990); Scott A. Taylor, Taxing Captive Insur-
ance: A New Solution for an Old Problem, 42 TAx LAW. 859 passim (1989); Donald Arthur Win-
slow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive
Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 79, 110-14 (1990); Armando Gomez, Note, A
Practical Approach to the Captive Insurance Problem: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 46
TAX LAW. 619, 620-23 (1993).
16. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,
2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir.) (indicating that
in Le Gierse the Supreme Court "was not writing a definition for all seasons and had no reason to").
The court went on to say that "it is impossible to see how risk shifting can be a sine qua non of
'insurance."' Id. at 862.
19. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 15, at 119 (describing the risk shifting/distributing standard
as dicta from dated U.S. Supreme Court authority and the Service's economic family theory as an
invention); Knight & Knight, supra note 15, at 417 (arguing that the "economic family" theory-
advanced by the Service in concluding that risk shifting and distributing were absent in some trans-
actions-cannot be reconciled with the Moline Properties doctrine); Note, The New York Stock
Exchange Gratuity Fund: Insurance That Isn't Insurance, 59 YALE L.J. 780, 782 (1950) (describing
the risk shifting/distributing test as "cryptic").
20. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40,
2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557.
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because various Code provisions explicitly sanction the taking of deduc-
tions for additions to reserves for some companies. For example, life
insurance companies facing ultimate liability for a given death benefit
22and nuclear energy companies facing decommissioning obligations
may properly deduct premium payments made into their own reserves.
Yet, despite the fact that establishing substantial financial reserves is a
wise move for any responsible company, the ability to do so at the ex-
pense of the United States Treasury is not a matter of easily obtained
Congressional grace. Should it be?
This Article asks and attempts to answer questions of doctrine and
policy. Should the "reserving function" be limited, as a matter of sound
tax policy, to a discrete subset of taxpayers operating in industries of
relative certainty (e.g., death, decommissioning, and the like), or should
Congress allow deductions for limited contributions to contingency re-
serves more broadly? If one deems a general contingency reserve regime
fiscally untenable, then can one rationally consider allowing gradual,
limited, and regulated reserving for companies "too big to fail?" Or, does
that approach ask way too much for financial exigencies that merely
might occur? Also, as a purely doctrinal matter, should the Service alto-
gether abandon its traditional, yet utterly shakable, risk shift-
ing/distributing approach, or reserve that approach for companies that
could be served well enough by the established insurance markets but
merely wish to use a captive insurance company to reduce overall operat-
ing expenses (i.e., leave this to experts, and don't try it at your office)?
Given the posture of various courts and commentators, one can cer-
tainly argue the case for tweaking the "insurance" test to accommodate
individual entities (or affiliated groups) with risks that are both statisti-
cally "certain-to-occur-at-some-point" and sufficiently numerous, ho-
mogenous, and independent 23 to take advantage of the law of large num-
bers without the involvement of an entity outside the affiliated group (for
example, a single corporate entity or group with a massive fleet of serv-
ice vehicles needing some form of insurance coverage).
In light of recent economic challenges, 24 now may be a good time to
reconsider the permissible ambit and optimal scope of the reserving func-
tion in the tax arena. We live in a time when one hungry corporate Goli-
ath grumbles impatiently behind its household name big brother, each
21. I.R.C. § 805(a)(2) (2006).
22. See I.R.C. § 468(a)(1)(A) (2006).
23. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1025 n.9 (1987) ("As a theoretical
matter, risk distribution or pooling requires: (i) Mass - * * * , (ii) Homogeneity - * * *, and (iii)
Independence - * * *. If these requirements are met to some minimum extent, the principles of
average and large numbers operate .... ").
24. See Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskopf, Inside the Breakdown at the SEC, TIME, Mar.
9, 2009, at 34, available at 2009 WLNR 3721270 (describing current economic conditions as "the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression").
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queuing for its slice of federal bailout. 25 Neither is alone. Americans are
also grumbling. They rightfully ask why they should be on the hook for
resuscitating companies that should have never been allowed to wade so
26far into the deep. With justified skepticism, they question the wisdom
of bailing out companies with their hard-eamed tax dollars27 while cor-
porate executives, without the restraining leash of rapt oversight,28 re-
cline on private jets and make their way to the next boondoggle hoping
that the redecoration of their offices will have been completed by the
time they get back.29 Given the potential negative economic ramifica-
tions for the broader U.S. economy, maybe certain companies were in-
deed "too big to fail"3°  but certainly they were not too big to strategi-
cally reserve some portion of their profits instead of routinely showering
millions31 on a select few for contract-based or "performance-based
' 32
compensation. Would it not be better for American taxpayers to collec-
tively suffer corporate deductions for the gradual creation of a limited
25. See, e.g., Bill Saporito, Is This Detroit's Last Winter?, TIME, Dec. 15, 2008, at 34, avail-
able at 2008 WLNR 23306940 (indicating that American International Group, Inc. ("AIG") and
Citigroup had received multi-billion dollar bailouts and that Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler
were hoping to receive federal bailouts). Some companies have returned several times for additional
assistance. See Francesco Guerrera, AIG Considers Break-up in Bid to Stay Afloat, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2009, at I (reporting that AIG might be broken up as part of a radical restructuring of the com-
pany and noting that, at the time, the government had bailed out AIG three times in five months).
26. See, e.g., Saporito, supra note 25, at 34 (highlighting situational irony by pointing out that
"AIG torpedoes the entire economy and gets a $150 billion handout; Citigroup takes risks no sane
manufacturing company would even contemplate and is rewarded with a $20 billion federal bail-
out").
27. Current proposals direct trillions of dollars at recovery efforts. See John Fritze, Trillions
Aimed at Recovery, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2009, at IA, available at 2009 WLNR 2668766 ("The
White House unveiled a sweeping proposal ... to spend as much as $2 trillion in public and private
funds to prop up the nation's financial system as the Senate narrowly approved an $838 billion
stimulus intended to jump-start the failing economy.").
28. See, e.g., Alan Beattie & Edward Luce, Obama Gets Tough on Pay for Executives, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at I (noting U.S. President Barack Obama's disgust at various Wall Street
excesses and reporting that Wall Street executives received $20 billion in bonuses in 2008 despite
massive market losses); see also Sarah O'Connor, Top Senators Rap Fed Over AIG Rescue, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at 3 (noting the warnings of the U.S. Senate's banking committee with respect
to future financial support of AIG given the "failure to reveal how the $163bn injected into the
insurance company has been spent").
29. See Mark DeCambre & Paul Tharp, Goofy Getaway-AIG Ripped for Senseless Spending,
N.Y. POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at 34, available at 2008 WLNR 19335564; see also Terry Keenan, The
Reign of Thain Was Mainly Just a Pain, N.Y. POST, Jan. 25, 2009, at 32, available at 2009 WLNR
1631465.
30. Many consider AIG the quintessential company that is "too big to fail." See, e.g., Bill
Saporito, How AIG Became Too Big to Fail, TIME, Mar. 30, 2009, at 24, available at 2009 WLNR
5204402.
31. See, e.g., Mimi Hall et al., Critics Blast AIG as Flap Escalates over Bonuses, USA
TODAY, Mar. 17, 2009, at IA, available at 2009 WLNR 5033330 (reporting growing public disgust
with corporate America and indicating that bonuses paid to certain AIG executives were negotiated
in early 2008). Apparently, compensation restraint is now a reality with respect to certain federal
funds recipients. See Beattie & Luce, supra note 28, at I (reporting that going forward, executives at
companies receiving a certain level of federal assistance would receive no more than $500,000 per
year as compensation).
32. Although I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) generally disallows a deduction in the publicly-held com-
pany context for "applicable employee remuneration" above $1,000,000, certain performance based
compensation is excluded from the definition of "applicable employee remuneration" under
§ 162(m)(4)(C). I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (limiting deductions for compensation in some contexts).
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contingency reserve with which the companies could head off full-scale
financial havoc at the pass (or at least make a hefty contribution to their
own bailout), rather than being forced to ante up a lump sum on short
order, bear the brunt of the various agency costs inherent in the corporate
form33 (enhanced and exacerbated by gargantuan bailout infusions), and
shoulder all of the attendant repayment risks at the same time?
Turning first to the doctrinal inquiry, Part I of this Article glances
back to the common law origin of the risk shifting/distributing standard
and reaches back a bit further, to highlight early authority in which the
Service frowns harshly on taxpayer deductions for self-reserving activity.
To flesh out evolving doctrinal contours and set the stage for a cri-
tique, Part II shifts the focus to the captive insurance company context
where much-if not most--of the litigation regarding risk shift-
ing/distributing has taken place. In addition to addressing the rise and fall
of the economic family argument empire, Part II also explains which
captive insurance arrangements work and highlights the Service's most
recent pronouncements that effectively delineate its current litigation
position.
Part III briefly summarizes prior criticism of the risk shift-
ing/distributing standards, both of which have been gradually weakened
by courts and commentators, before going on to explore the question of
whether recent IRS pronouncements reflect a new and aggressive eleva-
tion of form over substance in the captive insurance arena. Part III also
notes that current business realities, coupled with the nefarious practices
that many insurance companies habitually employ, compel some ques-
tioning of the utility of the risk shifting/distributing standards. Arguably,
these standards best apply in more idealistic settings.
Part IV presents and assesses a two-pronged proposal for reform:
the allowance of both contextual self-insuring (which seeks to modify the
prevailing standard), and utilitarian contingency reserving (which would
permit regulated contingency reserving using existing nuclear decom-
33. One commentator notes the following:
Agency costs are defined as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any resid-
ual loss, incurred to prevent shirking by agents. In turn, shirking is defined to include any
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a
whole. As such, shirking includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, over-
sight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes.
... [A]gency costs are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other
than the residual claimant.
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 35-37 (2002). Directors and offi-
cers of companies are often protected from liability for mismanagement of the business and affairs
of a given company. Indeed, those individuals often enjoy several layers of protection, given that
they tend to be covered by both primary policies and several "excess" policies (i.e., those that will
generally pay after primary policy limits have been reached). See Eric S. Connuck, Excess D&O
Insurance: The Exhaustion by Payment Condition, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 45.
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missioning reserve fund rules and procedures as a basic model). Part V
sets forth concluding thoughts.
1. TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS: "INSURANCE COMPANY" AND
"INSURANCE"
Insurance companies, whether life and health companies or property
and casualty companies, commonly have substantial amounts of both
underwriting income (e.g., premium payments, fees, and assessments)
34
and investment income (e.g., interest, dividends, and rents).35 At the
same time, these companies, because they perform an important societal
function, enjoy favorable treatment under the federal income tax laws.
Among other things, they have the ability to take current deductions for
increases in certain internal reserves. 36 Reasoning that an entity devoted
primarily to the generation of investment income should not enjoy un-
duly favorable tax treatment, Congress requires that an entity seeking to
qualify as an "insurance company" for federal income tax purposes sat-
isfy both qualitative and quantitative standards. Speaking in general
terms, the company must be in the business of issuing insurance or annu-
ity contracts,37 and that business activity must constitute more than half
of all the company's total business.
38
Although the "more than half' quantitative standard has long ap-
plied to life insurance company determinations, non-life companies (such
as property and casualty) could, at least until recently, qualify as insur-
ance companies by establishing that the issuing of insurance contracts
was their "primary and predominant" business activity. 39 By way of the
Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004,40 Congress eliminated the quantita-
tive standard duality and now requires that all insurance companies sat-
isfy the "more than half' standard.41 Unfortunately, Congress did not use
that legislation as a vehicle to clarify the precise meaning of "insurance."
34. See KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 971
(13th ed. 2000).
35. See I.R.C. § 832(b)(2) (2006) (listing specific items of investment income).
36. Life insurance companies are entitled to a deduction for increasing their life insurance
reserves. See I.R.C. §§ 805(a)(2), 807(b), (c)(1) (2006). Other insurance companies are allowed
adjustments in calculating underwriting income for increases in unearned premiums and unpaid loss
reserves. See § 832(b)(3), (b)(4)(B), (b)(5)(A)(ii).
37. The company may also qualify as an insurance company by reinsuring risks which are
underwritten by insurance companies. I.R.C. § 816(a)(2) (2006). For a basic application of the quali-
tative standard, see Allied Fid. Corp. v. Comm'r, 572 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
wholly-owned subsidiary was not an insurance company because the character of its primary busi-
ness, the writing of bail bonds, was not the writing of contracts of insurance).
38. § 816(a)(2).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1972). Thus, it was simply easier for a prop-
erty and casualty company to qualify as an insurance company. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at
1402-04 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1047 (indicating Congress's intent to create a
standard more strict and precise for life insurance company characterization).
40. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-218, § 206, 118 Stat. 596, 611
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 83 1(c) (2006)).
41. See I.R.C. §§ 816(a)(2), 831(c).
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Thus, as a traditional starting point, we are left with the risk shift-
ing/distributing standards set forth in 1941, in the landmark case of
Helvering v. Le Gierse.42
Less than a month before her death, 80-year-old Edyth Le Gierse
purchased both a single-premium life insurance contract and an annuity
from the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company ("Connecticut
General").43 Together, the contracts obligated Connecticut General to
pay her $589.80/year for the remainder of her life and a $25,000 death
benefit to her daughter, the designated beneficiary. 44 Edyth executed the
contracts and paid $27,125 in a lump sum to Connecticut General. 45 Ul-
timately, it was hoped that these arrangements would allow the exclusion
of the $25,000 death benefit from Edyth's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes.46 Concluding that the death benefits should not have been
excluded from Edyth's gross estate, the Commissioner asserted a defi-
ciency, but was forced to pursue the case to the U.S. Supreme Court be-
fore achieving the desired result.47
Writing for the majority, Justice Murphy noted that the parties com-
plied in all respects with standard contractual formalities,4 8 but went on
to emphasize that "the [purported insurance] amounts must be received
as the result of a transaction which involved an actual 'insurance risk' at
the time the transaction was executed. Historically and commonly insur-
ance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing., 49 Viewing the transac-
tion holistically, the Court concluded that the life insurance contract
would not have been issued without the annuity contract and that
"[c]onsidered together, the contracts wholly fail to spell out any element
of insurance risk., 50 The Court emphasized that all contract consideration
was prepaid,5 1 and any risk that the amounts paid by Edyth Le Gierse
would not generate earnings sufficient to cover the annuity payments due
her was an investment risk, not an insurance risk.52 Accordingly, the
Court held that the $25,000 should have been included in the decedent's
gross estate.53
Although there is only so much to be learned about the fundamental
nature of insurance from Le Gierse-namely, that insurance is not the
42. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
43. Id. at 536.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 537-38.
47. See id. at 537.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. at 541.
51. Id. at 542.
52. Id.; see also Comm'r v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1950) ("[T]here is no
risk unless there is uncertainty or, to use a better term, fortuitousness.").
53. See Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 542.
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equivalent of a mere investment risk5 4 -the opinion serves as landmark
decision because it articulates the risk-shifting and risk-distributing stan-
dards.55 Even though the Le Gierse opinion was criticized as cryptic soon
after issuance of the opinion56 and weakened, to some extent, by subse-
quent judicial developments 57 and scholarly commentary, 58 the two-part
test has managed to survive for decades. 59 Whether this sturdy, concep-
tual immunity is a good thing, whether its application remains justifiable,
and whether the standard has weathered steady criticism in worse condi-
tion than its proponents are willing to acknowledge, all remain open
questions to be addressed in the following Parts of this Article.
There remains a need to separate true "insurance" companies enti-
tled to favorable tax treatment from non-insurance companies that fail to
qualify for favorable treatment. Thus, some gate-keeping standard must
be in place. That standard must, however, be rational, and ideally should
be fully consistent with sound tax policy. Further, compliance standards
should be readily ascertainable, given that a company that unwittingly
fails the standard may find itself in an unexpected or unworkable tax
environment, and those paying purported premiums may suddenly find
that deduction of the amount was improper.
Whether deservedly or not, captive insurance companies and their
premium-paying organizers have historically been the predominant vic-
54. See id. For a more recent statement of this principle, see Rev. Rul. 89-96, 1989-2 C.B.
114, 1989 WL 550753 (emphasizing that the mere assumption of an investment risk cannot create an
insurance contract for federal income tax purposes).
55. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (citing Le Gierse and
noting that it is United States Supreme Court precedent).
56. See Note, supra note 19, at 782. The Note also argues that in Estate of Strauss, the Tax
Court erred in concluding that risk-shifting had not occurred and that the death benefit plan at issue
did not constitute "insurance." See id at 784-86. The Tax Court was later reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Treganowan, 183 F.2d at 293.
57. See Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1995); Ocean Drill-
ing & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1144-46 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amerco, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 164-65 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Humana, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 255 (6th Cir. 1989); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920,
922 (10th Cir. 1986); Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Kidde Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 56-57 (1997), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1025-27
(1987); Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4,
2005 WL 1415557; Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; Rev. Rul. 78-338,
1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by
Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-028 (June 14,
1996), 1996 WL 326435.
58. See Christopherson, supra note 15, at 127-28; Gantt, supra note 15, at 517-20; Gomez,
supra note 15, at 624-28; Knight & Knight, supra note 15, at 409; Minto, supra note 15, at 841-47;
Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 254-55; Singer, supra note 15, at 123, 133-34; Taylor,
supra note 15 passim; Winslow, supra note 15, at 94-99.
59. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (emphasizing that risk-
shifting and risk-distribution must be present in order for an arrangement to constitute insurance for
federal income tax purposes).
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tims of the two-part "insurance" test. 60 To some extent, their bad luck
was fortuitous because it resulted in a degree of healthy doctrinal modifi-
cation 61 and, at the same time, provided an accessible setting for thor-
ough doctrinal assessment.
Part II of this Article provides an in-depth examination of the rigor-
ous attempt to apply the risk shifting/distributing standard in the captive
insurance company context, the industry's creative responses, the con-
ceptual concessions made by the Service, and the structural limits im-
posed on taxpayers. Part II closes by presenting the doctrinal status quo
and discussing two recent IRS pronouncements that clarify the Service's
current litigating position and serve as analytical segues to the critique
presented in Part III and proposals presented in Part IV.
II. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION AND THE STATUS Quo: CAPTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
A. Captive Insurance Companies-General Description and the Lurking
Problem
Although it is easy to think of captive insurance companies existing
only as wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries providing coverage to their
parent or brother-sister entities (a "pure" captive), in reality captive in-
surance companies take many forms.62 In addition to those organized in
the United States, pure captives are commonly organized offshore in
foreign jurisdictions.63 Often this is because foreign jurisdictions have
less demanding standards with respect to insurance company formation
60. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 840 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
"insurance" cannot exist between a "sham" captive and insureds in its corporate family); Carnation
Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that no "insurance" exists if a
company's risks are purportedly insured with an unrelated entity which reinsures those risks with the
insured's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary); Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573
(setting forth the "economic family" theory as justification for denying deductions with respect to
amounts paid to captive insurance companies-i.e., those within the same corporate family-
because such amounts did not constitute "insurance" premiums), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,
200 1-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
61. See, e.g., Amerco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
parent, and a brother sister entity, can have a true insurance transaction with the parent's captive
insurance company when the captive has substantial outside insurance business); Harper Group v.
Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a captive insurance company with 29/-
33% of its business coming from unrelated insureds could have true "insurance" relationships with
members of its corporate family); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860, 864 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that Sears purchased "insurance" from its wholly-owned subsidiary, Allstate,
and noting that 99.75% of Allstate's business came from other sources); Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r,
881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate and holding that
there was risk-shifting and risk-distributing when a captive insured the risks of brother-sister enti-
ties); Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232 (noting that the Service "will no
longer raise the 'economic family theory,"' set forth in Rev. Rul. 77-316, "in addressing whether
captive insurance transactions constitute valid insurance" and indicating that "the Service will ad-
dress such transactions on a case-by-case basis").
62. See, e.g., Minto, supra note 15, at 841-42.
63. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
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and lower levels of ongoing oversight. 64 Several businesses may come
together to form a "group captive" (which insures the various liability
risks of its owners/members), 65 and it is not uncommon for a given busi-
ness (whose clients routinely need to secure some form of insurance) to
form a "sponsored captive" 66 for the benefit of its clients. In that setting,
the sponsored captive creates segregated financial cells to isolate and
thereby protect individual client risks from the risks of others.
67
Whatever the form, companies generally resort to a captive insur-
ance arrangement to secure coverage that is either unavailable or difficult
to obtain at a reasonable price (for example, insurance for medical mal-
practice, 68 latent construction defects, or potential earthquake damage 69).
Alternatively, companies may also resort to a captive for financial or
strategic reasons,7 ° such as to lower the cost of insurance or invest the
insurance company's reserves. 71 These legitimate, rational business pur-
poses have never managed, on their own, to establish the existence of an
"insurance arrangement, 72 under the Le Gierse standards.
Indeed, captive insurance company arrangements remain consis-
tently vulnerable to attack because a company purportedly paying a pre-
mium to the captive bears an uncomfortable resemblance to a company
contributing to a contingency reserve, and the Service has long been hos-
tile to the notion that a taxpayer deserves a deduction for that.73 For ex-
ample, in Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner,7 4 the taxpayer oper-
ated a coal mine and was obligated by state law to obtain workmen's
compensation insurance either by securing it from a private carrier, par-
ticipating in the state insurance fund, or by demonstrating an independent
ability to pay claims. 75 Opting to take the latter route, the taxpayer estab-
64. See id. at 253-54; see also Christopherson, supra note 15, at 132-33 (pointing out that
offshore formation of captives is common because offshore domiciles have lower capitalization
requirements, more lax reporting requirements, and a less stringent regulatory environment).
65. See Minto, supra note 15, at 842.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Gantt, supra note 15, at 498-500 (noting that medical malpractice insurance needs
have prompted many responses, including the formation of captive insurance companies).
69. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
70. See Christopherson, supra note 15, at 122 (stating that, among other reasons, health care
providers may form a captive to control premium and capital investment and obtain coverage
broader than that which is commercially available). Christopherson also notes that by forming a
captive, a company should be able to minimize administrative costs, eliminate third-party profit
margins, reduce loss exposures, and improve claim management. See id. at 123.
71. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
72. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986) (emphasiz-
ing that the legitimacy of the business purpose behind forming the captive does not establish risk-
shifting and risk-distributing and does not foreclose a finding of the absence of either).
73. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1024 (1987) ("Although technically transfer
of risk may occur when a captive is involved that is a separate, viable entity, financially capable of
meeting its obligations, we simply declined to recognize it as such when the arrangement was merely
in substance the equivalent of a reserve for losses or self-insurance.").
74. 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930).
75. Id. at 78.
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lished a "Welfare or Compensation Insurance Fund ' 76 and ultimately
sought to deduct amounts contributed to the fund as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses.77 The Service objected, claiming the amounts
were not "expenses" but rather "reserves" set aside for contingent
losses.78 Siding with the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that:
The whole object of self-insurance is to avoid the expense of in-
surance premiums. If the petitioner had elected to insure its risks in
the state fund or a private company, it would have expended the pre-
mium and shifted the risk; instead, it retained the risk and kept the
premium. Having elected not to expend the premium, it cannot
charge a corresponding sum as an "expense." ... [T]he petitioner is
not entitled to deduct as an expense a sum of money which it might
have expended for insurance premiums, but did not.
79
The dilemma faced by taxpayers in situations like those in Spring
Canyon Coal Company did not resolve itself over time. Aggressively
seeking (or legally obligated) to acquire some form of designated insur-
ance, and determined to do so in a manner they deemed financially feasi-
ble, companies were rather creative in their efforts to get both the cover-
age and the benefit of something akin to a premium payment deduction.
80
The Service did not sit idly by. To the extent that companies steered clear
of naked contingency fund reserving and moved towards the use of sepa-
rately-incorporated but wholly-owned "insurance" entities, the Service
countered by creating or appealing to broad-sweeping doctrines to disal-
low deductions for what it considered contingency reserve contribu-
tions.8 1 For decades, the "economic family" theory was the Service's
weapon of choice.
82
B. The Rise and Fall of the "Economic Family" Argument Empire
The Service formally set forth its "economic family" theory in
Revenue Ruling 77-3 1683 by presenting and assessing three hypothetical
situations. In each situation, a new, wholly-owned foreign insurance sub-
sidiary provides fire and other casualty insurance to members of its cor-
porate family.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 80.
80. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981) (using a fronting
company obligated to reinsure with a wholly-owned captive insurance subsidiary and using a con-
tingent capitalization agreement to persuade the fronting company).
81. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573 (announcing the "economic
family" theory), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
82. See, e.g., id.; Sedore, supra note 15, at 1105. Commentators note that the Service has
challenged the current deductibility of premiums paid to captive insurance companies by appealing
to various theories. See, e.g., Sedore, supra note 15, at 1105-06.
83. See Rev. Rul. 77-316.
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REv. RUL. 77-316, SITUATION 1
In Situation 1, X and its wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries, A and
B, paid amounts to S1, a wholly-owned foreign "insurance" subsidiary of
X, for various forms of property and casualty insurance. The rates paid
by X, A, and B were commercially appropriate, and Si provided insur-
ance only to X, A, and B.
I/ I
REV. RUL. 77-316, SITUATION 2
In Situation 2, the scenario is similar, however Y and its wholly-
owned subsidiaries, A and B, paid amounts to M, an unrelated insurance
company (a "fronting company" 84) which, by agreement, reinsured 95%
of this risk with S2, Y's wholly-owned foreign insurance subsidiary.
84. See Minto, supra note 15, at 847.
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REv. RUL. 77-316, SITUATIoN 3
In Situation 3, the facts are similar to Situation 1, but Z and its
wholly-owned, domestic subsidiaries, A and B, paid amounts to S3, and
by prior agreement, S3 reinsured 90% of this risk with W, an unrelated
insurance company.
In assessing the deductibility of amounts paid from the parent com-
pany and subsidiaries to the relevant entity, Revenue Ruling 77-316
starts by emphasizing both the risk shifting/distributing standards set
forth in Le Gierse and the historical judicial hostility directed towards
taxpayer attempts to take deductions for contributions to self-insurance
reserves. 85 The Service concluded that the amounts paid over to Si, S2,
and S3 do not involve risk shifting or risk distributing because the parent
company, insured subsidiaries, and captive all "represent[ed] one eco-
nomic family." 86 Accordingly, the Service reasoned that those suffering
the loss ultimately bear the financial burden of the loss. 87 The Service did
clarify that an arrangement constituted insurance to the extent risks were
retained by third-party insurers or passed on to reinsurers (for example,
the 5% retained by the fronting company in Situation 2 and the 90%
passed on in Situation 3).8 Further, amounts paid by the purported in-
sured subsidiaries (as premiums) and amounts paid by the captive (as
loss coverage) to those subsidiaries were generally recast as dividends
from one entity to the common parent followed by a contribution of a
given amount to the intended recipient as a capital contribution; "pre-
mium" payments from the parent to the captive were recast as capital
contributions to the captive, and loss coverage payments from the captive
to the parent were deemed to be dividends to the parent. 89 Given that its
conclusions were facially at odds with Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-







missioner,90 which dictates that an entity organized for legitimate busi-
ness activity is treated as a separate taxable entity, the Service attempted
to reconcile the differences. The Service emphasized that it respected the
separate corporate existence of the various entities (giving due regard to
their business activity), but opted to "examine[] the economic reality"
presented by each hypothetical situation.
91
For several years, the Service's economic family argument managed
to secure a degree of traction, especially in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer cre-
ated a wholly-owned Bermuda subsidiary to insure its risks, as well as
the risks of several of its subsidiaries. 92 By prior arrangement, Carnation
paid premiums directly to American Home Assurance Company, which
proceeded to reinsure 90% of Carnation's business with Carnation's cap-
tive insurance subsidiary. It was clear, however, that American Home
would not have entered into an agreement with the captive unless Carna-
tion agreed to further capitalize the captive if needed. 93 Denying the
deductibility of 90% of the premium paid to American Home, the court
refused to countenance the fronting company strategy adopted by Carna-
tion.94 It also affirmatively rejected any Moline Properties arguments,95
and thereby substantially aligned itself with the Service's position in
Situation 2 in Rev. Rul. 77-316.
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit drove the point home in
Cloughtery Packing Co. v. Commissioner.96 Cloughtery Packing held
that, even in the absence of a contingent capitalization agreement, a par-
ent corporation's payment of premiums to an unrelated insurer who, by
pre-arrangement, reinsures that risk with a captive insurance company of
the parent is not payment of an "insurance" premium because the parent
"retains an economic stake in whether a covered loss occurs. 97 All
along, it should have been known that the outright defiance of the Moline
Properties mandate via the economic family theory could not last.
90. 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). ("The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorpora-
tion or to avoid or comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.").
91. Rev. Rul. 77-316.
92. Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1013.
95. Id. ("We reject Carnation's contention that [language quoted from Revenue Ruling 77-
316] conflicts with the recognition of the separate status of corporations.").
96. 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. Id. at 1299, 1307 (indicating that there was no indemnification, capitalization, or other
guarantee in place with respect to the parent company and the wholly-owned captive insurance
company).
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Although the captives in Carnation and Clougherty Packing insured
no one outside their affiliated group, 98 a number of wholly-owned or
controlled insurance companies (which are technically captive insurance
companies relative to their parent entities) have a substantial amount of
outside business.99 To conclude that such "captives" can have valid in-
surance relationships with non-affiliated entities, while being unable to
have such relationships with affiliated entities, would defy logic and ef-
fectively gut Moline Properties. The Tax Court embraced this reality in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner. 00 Even though the court concluded that
the percentage of insurance business from unrelated parties was insuffi-
cient, 1° it noted that the existence of sufficient outside business would
clear the self-insurance taint of an arrangement between various affili-
ated entities and their captive insurance company.1
02
Several years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted this view. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, the
court held that Sears was purchasing true "insurance" from its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Allstate, 10 3 because 99.75% of Allstate's business
came from other sources. 0 4 Other Courts of Appeals, as well as the Serv-
ice, have since clarified that lower percentages of outside business will
suffice,10 5 but the more significant development lies in the fact that the
decisions collectively establish the relative irrelevance of risk shifting in
the face of substantial risk distribution. Even in the absence of a risk-
shifting imperative, however, the Service could still require the existence
of substantial outside business before acquiescing to the existence of a
valid insurance relationship' 6-or so it thought.
Even before Sears, Roebuck and Co. and its progeny challenged the
core legitimacy of a risk shifting inquiry, at least one court had begun to
98. Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1299; Carnation Co., 640 F.2d at 1012.
99. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that Allstate, a subsidiary of Sears, had substantial outside business).
100. 89 T.C. 1010, 1027-28 (1987) (concluding that the fact that the reinsuring captive insur-
ance company had 2% net premium income from unrelated parties did not result in the characteriza-
tion of "premiums" paid indirectly by the parent corporation and its affiliates as "insurance" premi-
ums).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1026-27.
103. 972 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 860.
105. See, e.g., Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1152 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding that true "insurance" existed between a captive insurance company and the
insureds in its corporate family when the captive had 44/o-66% of its business coming from unre-
lated entities); Amerco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding sufficient unre-
lated business at 520/,74% of total business); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing unrelated business was 29-/o-33% percent of total business).
106. See e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1027-28 (1987) (concluding that 2% of
net premiums from outside sources was sufficient to create an insurance relationship between a
captive and its affiliated); see also Christopherson, supra note 15, at 128 (pointing out that courts
will look to the level ofa subsidiary's outside business in determining whether an insurance relation-
ship exists between the parent and the subsidiary).
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whittle away at the outside business requirement. In Humana, Inc. v.
Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, over
the contrary opinion of the Tax Court, that risk shifting and risk distribut-
ing were present when a captive insurance company insured the risks of
its brother-sister entities.10 7 However, it did not extend to the parent-
captive relationship. 0 8 The Tax Court, in considering the parent-captive
relationship, concluded that the payment of a covered loss by the captive
to the parent would ultimately show up on the parent's balance sheet as a
reduction in the value of the captive's stock, 10 9 a result it found offensive
in light of its belief that true risk shifting must occur and that "[t]rue in-
surance relieves the firm's balance sheet of any potential impact of the
financial consequences of the insured peril."'
' 10
Although the Tax Court's logic could not apply with respect to
payments for the losses of brother-sister entities of the captive, the court
chose not to invite or sanction the favorable manipulation of corporate
structure."' Emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate 1 2 and firmly
rejecting the Service's economic family argument, 13 the Sixth Circuit
opted to go a different route, respecting the balance sheet analysis with
regard to the parent, but finding a valid insurance relationship between
the brother-sister entities and the captive. Other courts soon followed
suit.'14
In addition to weathering judicial assault, the economic family the-
ory found itself the target of scholarly criticism. One commentator
charged the Service with abusing its discretion by inventing and advocat-
ing an "eccentric theory of law" to "provide a quick fix for a perceived
abuse,"115 rather than doing the legwork to mount an effective attack on
more established grounds. 1 6 Although the commentator acknowledged
107. 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate and
holding that there was risk-shifting and risk-distributing when a captive insured the risks of brother-
sister entities).
108. Id.
109. Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 197, 211-12 & n. 13 (1987).
110. Id. at 211.
Ill. Id. at 213-14.
112. Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 252.
113. Id. at 257.
114. See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M (CCH) 1020, 1997
WL 663283, at *18, *26-27 (1997) (concluding that, between a captive insurance subsidiary and its
brother-sister entities, there was bona fide "insurance"); Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.
Cl. 42, 67 (1997) (holding that a parent company could deduct amounts paid-to cover its sepa-
rately-incorporated subsidiaries-to unrelated insurer ceding amounts to parent's captive insurance
subsidiary but denying such treatment with respect to payments made on behalf of the parent's
divisions), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision).
115. Singer, supra note 15, at 115.
116. See id. at 127 (arguing that the Service might have been able to attack the transactions by
using § 482). Singer also notes that the Service may have had little confidence in existing precedent
to support a transaction recharacterization approach. See id. at 123.
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that taxpayers might form captives in attempts to abuse the tax system, 117
he went on to endorse an alternative that would have the Service focus
on the captive (i.e., the income side) and require that it satisfy certain
requirements in order to qualify for special treatment.118
Other commentators, like some courts, highlighted the simple in-
ability to reconcile the economic family theory with the mandate of
Moline Properties.1 19 Even while noting that companies forming captive
insurance companies may be motivated, to some extent, by tax consid-
erations, they reasoned that such motivations have never sufficed to dis-
allow premium deductions at the parent level, especially in light of the
120legitimate business reasons for forming captives and the doctrine that a
subsidiary be treated as a separate and distinct entity when the parent
effectively establishes the subsidiary's business purpose.121
In response to the occasional irrelevance of a risk-shifting in-
quiry,122 ready judicial acceptance of brother-sister-captive insurance
relationships, 123 scholarly criticism,124 and overt judicial rejection of the
economic family argument, 125 the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2001-
31.126 In doing so, the Service promised that it would "no longer raise the
'economic family theory' set forth in Revenue Ruling 77-316 ... in ad-
dressing whether captive insurance transactions constitute valid insur-
ance."' 127 The Service did emphasize that, in general, it would continue to
analyze individual arrangements on a case-by-case basis and specifically
challenge some arrangements, such as alleged sham transactions 128 and
117. Id. at 117.
118. Id. at 162-64. Singer would generally require proper record keeping and management,
adequate and properly invested reserves, proper risk pooling, arms-length pricing, and maintenance
of a sufficient level of unrelated policyholder business. Id. at 163. Singer also set forth simple disal-
lowance of a deduction for premiums paid to a related party, but he questioned the wisdom of that
approach, given the ordinariness of transferring risk to a legitimate insurance company. Id. at 162.
119. Knight& Knight, supra note 15, at 417.
120. Id. at 404.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1992).
123. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247,255 (6th Cir. 1989).
124. See, e.g., Christopherson, supra note 15, at 128 (noting that the "economic family ap-
proach has been widely rejected"); Gomez, supra note 15, at 627-28 (arguing for the eradication of
the economic family theory and the institution of a two-part inquiry into the legitimacy of the insur-
ance company and the particulars of given transactions).
125. See Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 257.
126. Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
127. Id. (internal citation omitted).
128. The Service specifically referenced Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, which held
that "insurance" cannot exist between a "sham" captive and insureds in its corporate family. Id.
(citing Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995)). According to the court, a
captive will be a "sham" captive if it is either (1) undercapitalized, (2) a party to a reinsurance ar-
rangement in which the captive's parent indemnifies the primary insurer for amounts owed by the
captive to the primary insurer, or (3) both. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 62 F.3d at 842-43.
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purported insurance transactions between parent entities and their cap-
tives.
129
C. The Status Quo
Even though the Service officially abandoned its economic family
argument in Revenue Ruling 2001-31, it tenaciously adheres to and ap-
plies the risk shifting/distributing standard in assessing purported insur-
ance arrangements. This may well be, in some contexts, a means of
appealing to the economic family theory under a safer rubric. Indeed,
recent IRS pronouncements demonstrate that the Service has already
taken the entire game to the next level. Rather than merely assessing the
existence of an insurance relationship when the transaction involves af-
filiated entities, the Service is now willing to scrutinize transactions be-
tween purported insureds and entities wholly unaffiliated with the insured
or its group (even when there is no reinsurance with a controlled subsidi-
ary of the insureds). Arguably, this move represents the opening salvo of
a new wave of intent: the elevation of form over substance in the captive
arena.
In Revenue Ruling 2005-40,131 the Service presented and assessed
four situations to clarify its current litigating position. Each situation is
presented schematically with the Service's assessment appearing imme-
diately thereafter. All situations involve a domestic entity, X, which op-
erates a courier transport business, owns a substantial fleet of automotive
vehicles, needs to insure those vehicles against various operational risks,
and pays an arm's length premium to Y for the coverage. Note that in
each instance, X owns vehicles "representing a significant volume of
independent, homogenous risks"' 32 (that is, enough to distribute risk in-
dependently), and that Y is adequately capitalized and operates in accord




REv. RUL. 2005-40, SITUATION 1
129. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that a parent-subsidiary transaction was not insurance).
130. Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B.
4, 2005 WL 1415557.
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In Situation 1, the X-Y contract constitutes 100% of Y's business.
The Service acknowledges that X shifted risk from itself to Y, but, after
noting that Y does not insure any non-X risks, concludes that Y has not
distributed X risks amongst other policyholders. Accordingly, the Serv-








REv. RUL. 2005-40, SITUATION 2
The facts in Situation 2 indicate that the X-Y contract constitutes
90% of Y's business and that the remaining 10% comes from Y's con-
tract with Z. Here too, the Service concludes that the relationship be-
tween X and Y is not an insurance relationship. Although Y's relation-
ship with Z adds some degree of risk distribution, the Service concludes
that the 10% of risk from Z is insufficient to alter the character of the X-










Purported Individual Insurance Arrangements
(LLCs disregarded for federal tax purposes)
REv. RUL. 2005- 40, SITUATION 3
In Situation 3, Y does not contract with X. Instead, Y contracts with
twelve LLCs, each of which has X as its single member. X conducts its
business through the LLCs, and each LLC has elected to be disregarded
for federal income tax purposes (that is, each LLC has elected not to be
treated as separate and distinct from X). The facts also indicate that each
contract between Y and a disregarded LLC constitutes 51/o-15% of Y's
total business and that Y insures no other entities. Because Y is treated as
contracting only with X, the Service concludes that the individual ar-










(LLCs regarded as separate and distinct associations for
federal tax purposes)
REv. RUL. 2005 - 40, SITUATION 4
Situation 4 is the same as Situation 3, except that the LLCs elect to
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Service concludes that the individual LLCs shift risk to Y and that the
risk is distributed amongst the twelve LLCs. Accordingly, the relation-
ships are deemed to constitute "insurance" relationships.'
37
The Service's most recent pronouncement in the captive insurance
arena is Revenue Ruling 2008-08,3' which involves a sponsored captive
in the form of a "protected cell company."1 39 A protected cell company is
similar, in many ways, to a group captive, an arrangement in which vari-
ous companies come together and form a captive for the purpose of in-
suring their own risks. 140 The Service has ruled that premium payments
to a group captive owned by thirty-one companies were "insurance"
premiums,141 noting that "because the taxpayer and the other insureds-
shareholders are not economically related, the economic risk of loss can
be shifted and distributed among the shareholders who comprise the in-
sured group."'' 42 A protected cell company differs from a group captive in
that separate cells/accounts are created for each equity holder making a
capital contribution, and each cell receives premiums and insures the
risks of the designated equity holder. 143 Revenue Ruling 2008-08 clari-
fies that insurance may or may not exist with respect to a given protected
cell company relationship.
137. Id.
138. Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340,2008 WL 131946.
139. Id.
140. See Minto, supra note 15, at 842.
141. Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909 (concluding that premium payments
made to a group captive owned by 31 companies were ordinary and necessary business expenses-
i.e., "insurance" premiums).
142. Id.
143. Gantt, supra note 15, at 520 ("With the protected cell, investor funds are not subject to
losses affecting other parts of an insurance company. Monies from investors would be deposited into







In this protected cell company arrangement, X only pays premiums
to Cell X, and Cell X only insures the risks (and pays the losses) of X.
144
Similarly, Cell Y only receives payments from 03, t, and w and only in-
sures the risks (and pays the losses) of those entities. 145 The Service con-
cluded that the arrangement between Cell X and X does not constitute an
insurance arrangement because the relationship is akin to one in which a
subsidiary insures only its parent. 146 Accordingly, risk shifting and risk
distributing are not present; thus, no insurance relationship exists.147 Not-
ing that the relationship between Cell Y and the wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies of Y were akin to a brother-sister insurance relationship, the Service
concluded that the arrangements constituted insurance given the presence
of adequate risk shifting and risk distributing. 1
48
III. CRITIQUE
Although the Service officially asserted that it would no longer em-
ploy the "economic family" argument in assessing captive insurance
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company arrangements, 4 9 recent IRS pronouncements demonstrate it did
not tell the whole truth. The prevailing common law environment will
not allow an economic family argument to succeed in a captive-brother-
sister setting. 50 But, depending on the level of non-parent business at the
subsidiary level, the Service can still get away with it in some parent-
captive contexts (or those deemed akin to that context) so long as the
position is cloaked in the garb of risk shifting and risk distributing.,'
Assuming arguendo that the risk shifting and risk distributing standards
were ever truly useful, they now arguably fall short as effective determi-
nants, especially in today's complex business environment.
A. The Shell of Risk Shifting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. and its progeny have firmly established that
an insurance relationship exists between a parent company and its
wholly-owned subsidiary when the subsidiary has a sufficient level of
outside business.152 Thus, although the Service routinely cites Le Gierse
on the way to its risk shifting and risk distributing analyses,'5 3 various
courts (whether explicitly or implicitly) fail to regard risk shifting, in the
traditionally-understood sense, as a sine qua non of insurance. 54 To the
extent a sufficient level of risk distribution is the key to eliminating the
risk shifting requirement, established companies with substantial outside
business enjoy an undue benefit relative to new and growing companies.
Although a given company may, after further development, reap the
same benefits, there remains the troubling problem of uni-directionality.
Under Sears, Roebuck & Co., an insurance relationship is deemed to
exist between a parent company and its wholly-owned captive insurance
subsidiary because the captive has a sufficient level of outside business
to distribute its risks adequately (in other words, because the captive has
enough homogenous, independent risks to satisfy the law of large num-
bers). 155 This reality does not change when the parent company adds its
risks to the mix, but, per the confirmation of Revenue Ruling 2008-08,
the street only runs one way. 56 If it is the parent (or a parent-like entity)
with enough homogenous, independent risks to satisfy the law of large
numbers, the Service will not respect the parent-captive arrangement as
149. Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
150. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 248-52 (6th Cir. 1989).
151. See, e.g,, Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1997
WL 663283, at *24-*26 (1997); Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 51-57 (1997),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
152. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.
153. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946.
154. See, e.g., Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 252-56.
155. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that Allstate
collects more than $5 billion in premiums annually and that "[s]ome 99.75% of Allstate's premiums
[come] from customers other than Sears").
156. Rev. Rul. 2008-08 (citing Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557; Rev.
Rul. 2002-89, 2002-2 C.B. 984, 2002 WL 31749579) (indicating that the relationship between X and
Cell X would not qualify as insurance).
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"insurance" in the absence of outside business at the captive level, be-
cause risk shifting and risk distribution are deemed absent.'57 That is, the
Service would refuse to find "insurance" despite the presence of effective
risk distribution and arguable irrelevance of the risk shifting standard. A
far more egregious problem arises when the Service elects to ignore risk-
distributing realities in a similar context: when a non-affiliated insurer is
involved and risk shifting cannot be denied.
B. The Husk of Risk Distribution: Doctrinal Issues
Under Revenue Ruling 2005-40, Situation 1, the Service will not re-
spect an arrangement as insurance where a single entity with risk distrib-
uting capacity happens to be the only insured with respect to an unre-
lated entity. 158 Arguably, this approach represents an aggressive eleva-
tion of form over substance. X's homogenous, independent risk units are
lumped together under a single corporate roof1 59 such that, for risk distri-
bution purposes, X is deemed to be nothing more than a single insured
corporate entity. 160 And while the Service appears to acknowledge the
existence of risk shifting,' 6' its final conclusion on Situation 1 reveals
something altogether suspect. Rather than recognizing the business real-
ity (that Y is insuring a large volume of homogenous, independent risks
such as individual vehicles), the Service deems Y's business activity to
be the attempt to insure one entity, X, even though Y, by contract, would
likely have been on the hook with respect to an individual vehicle loss,
and not solely on the loss of the entire fleet. The Service's posture in this
regard is perplexing in light of the Tax Court's conclusion in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner that "a single insured can have sufficient unre-
lated risks to achieve adequate risk distribution,"' 162 and the IRS's pro-
nouncement indicating that "a single taxpayer may transfer an amount of
homogenous and statistically independent risks which would be suffi-
cient to satisfy the risk distribution requirement."'
163
The question then becomes whether it is appropriate to pierce the
veil of the nominal insured for risk distribution assessment purposes.164
Surprisingly, as discussed below, the Service willingly confirmed in at
least one instance that individual independent risk exposures are meas-
157. Compare Rev. Rul. 2008-08 (finding that no insurance relationship existed in a given
transaction because it was akin to a parent-subsidiary relationship), with Sears, Roebuck & Co., 972
F.2d at 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that insurance existed when a subsidiary with substantial outside
business insured its parent).




162. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. (CCH) 1010, 1026 (1997).
163. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. (Oct. 19, 1998), 1998 WL 34066011.
164. Logic and experience dictate that when an insurance company issues a group life insur-
ance policy, there is no confusing insured individuals with the common corporate employer.
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ured by looking within the corporate entity, 65 not by viewing the corpo-rate entity as a single insured unit.
In Private Letter Ruling 9624028, the Service addressed the de-
ductibility of amounts paid by thirty-six Funds to an assessable mutual
insurance company owned solely by the thirty-six Funds and formed to
insure them against various loss events with respect to the investments
made by each Fund. 166 After highlighting the fact that none of the Funds
owned a controlling interest in the mutual, 167 the Service noted the fol-
lowing:
[1]n terms of risk distribution, we note that Mutual has accepted a
large number of independent risks and is taking advantage of the
"law of large numbers." (The (independent) risk exposures here are
possible defaults of any one of the 28x issues of "securities" of Fund
1 (or the possible default of any of the issues of any other of the 35
funds).)
168
Thus, the Service privately says that it will look beyond the corporate
shell at individual risk units to ascertain whether risk has been ade-
quately distributed, but pronounces something altogether different in
Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 2005-40. The analytical consistency does
not improve with Situations 2-4 of that pronouncement.
In Situation 2, the Service concludes that the presence of an addi-
tional business source does not automatically alter the character of the X-
Y relationship. 69 However, to the extent that this ruling and others des-
ignate or look to a specific percentage of outside business as key to the
"insurance" analysis, they reveal nothing more than arbitrary line-
drawing. The Service's conclusions regarding Situations 3 and 4, viewed
together, would appear to allow, rather inexplicably,1 70 a taxpayer to cre-
ate or destroy "insurance" merely by making an election. 17 1 Yet, random
elevations of form over substance have been prohibited in this arena
since Edyth Le Gierse struck her deal with Connecticut General. Or at
least that's been the long-running story.
C. The Husk of Risk Distribution: The Modern "Insurance" Reality
Wholly aside from doctrinal problems, practical realities do not jibe
well with the Service's prevailing risk distribution standard. The canvas
of background assumptions is too pristine. Although it may be comfort-
165. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-028 (June 14, 1996), 1996 WL 326435.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4,2005 WL 1415557.
170. See Sedore, supra note 15, at 1104 (describing the Service's rationale in assessing Situa-
tions 3 and 4 as "somewhat inexplicable" because in some instances, the Service respects the sepa-




ing to assume that insurance companies willingly offer life, health, and
other forms of insurance to broad segments of the population and quietly
allow the law of large numbers to operate, the truth is far nastier.
Modem insurance is a business more so than ever, and rather than
suffer the vagaries of the law of large numbers, underwriters do their best
to outsmart or outmaneuver it. Companies impose tough underwriting
standards and thereby manage to issue unwarranted denials of coverage.
And even when coverage is offered and premiums are paid over time in
good faith, companies habitually attempt to deny coverage by appealing
to, among other things, contractual exclusions for "pre-existing condi-
tions" and "experimental" treatments. 172
The case of Patrick Tumulty is typical. After paying health insur-
ance premiums to Assurant Health for six years (under a series of six-
month policies), 173 the company ultimately refused coverage for Tu-
multy's kidney disease. 174 Because the company treated him as a new
insured under each contract, 75 his ailment was deemed a pre-existing
condition when it was finally diagnosed176-prior medical tests under
"prior" policies proved it. 177
If certain commentators are to be believed, the problem of unwar-
ranted coverage denial is rampant. In his searing documentary on the
American health care system, 178 Michael Moore captured the prevailing
sentiment. One claims adjuster noted, "' [People aren't] slipping through
the cracks,' . . . '[The insurance companies] made the crack and are
sweeping you toward it.'' 179 Thus, at least with respect to some forms of
insurance, the theoretical operation of risk distribution stands in stark
contrast to practical realities.
Further, at the same time that companies are attempting to minimize
or eliminate the negative impact of the law of large numbers in one
sphere, they are also flouting, misinterpreting, or simply ignoring the
fundamental rules of traditional risk distribution elsewhere. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, the AIG saga adds an exclamation point
to that assertion and helps reveal the truly limited utility of the risk dis-
tribution standard, as currently applied as an "insurance" determinant.
172. See Karen Tumulty, The Health Care Crisis flits Home, TIME, Mar. 16, 2009, at 26,
available at 2009 WLNR 4231105 (discussing the misfortune of Patrick Tumulty whose kidney
disease was deemed to be a non-covered, pre-existing condition by Assurant Health, which issued






178. SICKO (Weinstein Company 2007).
179. Richard Corliss, Sicko Is Socko, TIME.COM, May 19, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1623337,00.html.
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As noted earlier, risk distribution relies on the operation of the law
of large numbers. With a sufficiently large pool of individuals, for exam-
ple, actual mortality and predicted mortality will roughly correspond due
to the accuracy of historical mortality and morbidity data. Thus, the law
of large numbers operates well in some insurance environments (such as
life insurance). If, however, a company seeks to insure against the occur-
rence of an event when there is no reliable data with respect to prior
events, accurate probabilities cannot be ascertained, and the law of large
numbers (no matter how large the pool of insureds) cannot be relied on
to match predicted and actual experience going forward. 180 As explained
below, AIG's treacherous dalliance with credit default swaps and special
purpose vehicles bears this out.
D. Special Purpose Vehicles, Credit Default Swaps, and Sub-Prime
Mortgages
Several years ago, there was a sharp and noticeable uptick in the
making of subprime loans. 181 Certain existing and aspiring homeowners
were easy targets.'8 2 Once originated, the individual mortgage obliga-
tions were transferred through the hands of various industry participants,
and ultimately pooled together in a trust or other entity-such as a spe-
cial purpose vehicle or "SPV" 83 -such that interested parties could in-
vest in the pool by purchasing debt securities of the SPV from the trus-
tor/seller. 84 In general, these securities were issued in tiers or tranches
which were rated by various credit rating agencies, like Standard &
Poor's, according to the likelihood that the holder would be paid (e.g.,
from "AAA" to "BBB" and below). 8 5 Before parting with higher ratings
for senior investment grade securities, however, rating agencies would
commonly require the SPV to obtain some form of credit enhancement,
such as a guarantee, to ensure that payment shortfalls with respect to
those securities would be covered. 86 For these senior tiers of debt, many
SPVs looked to insurance companies to provide the requisite payment
guarantee. 1
87
180. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 878-82.
181. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder
in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 571 (2002).
182. See id. at 572.
183. Id. at 538-39.
184. Id. at 539.
185. Id. at 540-41; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2047 (2007).
186. Engel & McCoy, supra note 185, at 2047.
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FIGURE 1: SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES
At the same time, at the other end of the equation, financial institu-
tions holding sub-prime, mortgage-backed debt obligations or some re-
packaged derivative thereof-such as a "collateralized debt obligation,"
or "CDO" 188-- would contract with counterparties to insure against de-
fault.189 AIG Financial Products Corporation ("AIGFP"), a subsidiary of
AIG, was one such counterparty. 190 AIGFP issued this form of "debt
insurance" 19 1 -referred to as a "credit default swap," or "CDS"-even
though it was organized as a bank and not an insurance company.,
92
Though the CDS business generated hundreds of millions of dollars of
insurance premium income when times were good, 193 the lurking obliga-
tions ultimately put AIG on the hook for various obligations under the
CDOs.
188. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, A Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A 1, available at 2008 WLNR 18427841.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Saporito, supra note 30, at 24 ("[A] CDS is, in its simplest form, an insurance policy.
... AIG wrote multiple insurance policies covering the same underlying package of increasingly
toxic assets.").
192. Id; Henny Sender, AIG Still Facing Huge Credit Losses, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at I
("AIG was particularly active in providing guarantees for... collateralised debt obligations, bonds
backed by debts such as subprime mortgages.").
193. Morgenson, supra note 188, at Al (indicating that the CDS business was generating as
much as $250 million in premium income).
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FIGURE 2: CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
With CDO stability ultimately depending on payment streams from
holders of sub-prime mortgages and on rising home values, it did not
take long for the disaster that was waiting in the wings to step in when
the housing bubble burst.
From a pure insurance theory perspective, the problem is clear.
Even with a large number of SPVs and an even larger pool of independ-
ent debt obligations insured against default, the law of large numbers can
operate successfully only if the insurance issuer has reliable probability
data with respect to the event insured against (i.e., default with respect to
the obligation held). 194 Large numbers matter because such numbers gen-
erally make actuarial predictions meaningful. 195 Regarding pool size in
this context, one commentator notes the following:
[Although credit derivatives may transfer insurance risk, an investor
who assumes this risk does not usually assume the risks of a suffi-
ciently large number of underlying obligors so as to pool and dilute
(or diversify) the risks in any statistically meaningful sense. As a re-
suit, these investors do not satisfy the pooling condition for insurance
and the contract should not constitute insurance for the credit protec-
tor or, under conventional wisdom, for the credit protected counter-
party.'
96
The news gets worse from a probability data perspective. It might
have been the case that historical mortgage default information was read-
ily available and could have provided predictive value with respect to
non-sub-prime mortgages. The same certainly cannot be said with re-
spect to obligations backed by pooled sub-prime mortgages. Securitiza-
tion of sub-prime mortgages is relatively new, and a priori probabilities
do not exist with respect to the likelihood that this particular type of
CDO will default. Acquiring a reliable default probability would have
required an extensive assessment of the prior performance of similarly-
backed CDOs, but at the time the "insurance" was issued, that informa-
tion did not exist. According to at least one commentator, industry par-
ticipants were, nonetheless, blindly undaunted:
194. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 877-83.
195. See Singer, supra note 15, at 116.
196. David S. Miller, Distinguishing Risk: The Disparate Tax Treatment of Insurance and
Financial Contracts in a Converging Marketplace, 55 TAX LAW. 481, 542 (2002).
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Financiers, as well as the investors who bought their wares and the
ratings agencies that evaluated them, agreed that by applying the
proper equations it was possible to, say, bundle a bunch of subprime
mortgages, chop them up and sell the pieces as fairly safe securities,
even as they were leveraged to the hilt. Why? The mathematical
models-backward-looking and based on just a few years' data from
an asset bubble-said so. 197
As it turns out, short-term experience proved negative for AIGFP,
and, for the sake of the larger financial sector: AIG, the parent company
ultimately liable, had to be rescued. To the extent that the prevailing
"risk distribution" assessment is based on the mere existence of a large
number of risk units in the insured pool, without any real effort to ascer-
tain whether reliable risk-occurrence probabilities exist for that pool, the
standard lacks real teeth and thus creates the appearance of insurance
where none truly exists. 198 Indeed, investment activity can masquerade as
"insurance." Ben Bemanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, hit the nail
on the head when he referred to AIGFP as "a hedge fund basically that
was attached to a large and stable insurance company. ' 199
And that is not the worst of it from a federal tax perspective.
Wholly aside from facts specific to AIGFP and AIG, if a given com-
pany's investment activities can mask as "insurance" (a likelihood en-
hanced by the proximity of legitimate insurance and the expectation of
some investment activity), then a company may undeservedly qualify as
an insurance company by appearing-to the naked eye-to satisfy the
"more than half' standard. And even if a company satisfies the "more
than half' standard, notwithstanding the masquerading of investment
activity as insurance (because of the extent of its pure insurance busi-
ness), the company nonetheless may understate its income by overstating
its unearned premiums and/or unpaid loss reserves.
Although the Service tenaciously adheres to standards and concepts
articulated in the 1940s to ascertain whether a given arrangement rises to
the level of "insurance, 2 ° ° modem courts have not hesitated to question
197. Barbara Kiviat, Reassessing Risk, TIME, Nov. 17, 2008, at I, available at 2008 WLNR
21138582.
198. In discussing the concept of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, one
commentator makes a similar point. See Steven J. Williams, Note, Distinguishing "Insurance "from
Investment Products under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Crafting a Rule of Decision, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1996 (1998) (noting that the securitization process itself may appear to shift risk from one
lender to another who pools and thereby distributes risk but does not, itself, constitute "insurance").
Highlighting the weakening of the line between banking and insurance, the author notes that "finan-
cial services innovation and expanding national bank powers have blurred the line between bank-
authorized investment products and insurance." Id. at 1996. The author further points out that "a
judicial definition of 'insurance' which only looks for some element of risk, without determining
whether that risk is of the kind commonly associated 'insurance,' will inevitably reach beyond any
common understanding of the term." Id. at 2019.
199. Sender, supra note 192, at 1.
200. See Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (citing Helvering v. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941)).
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the relevance of a risk-shifting inquiry. 2° ' In doing so, they rob that prong
of the analysis of its evaluative force more generally. Further, even
though there are those who embrace risk distribution as the true essence
of insurance,2 °2 scholars compellingly argue that the law of large num-
bers has predictive value only when attached to reliable probability
203data, a point which is occasionally lost on, ignored, or suppressed by
modem-day insurers. Additionally, the law of large numbers does not
appear to be a sine qua non of a risk distribution finding by the Service.
It also bears noting that, in some contexts, adequate risk distribution is
the only hurdle to clear. One commentator summarizes the problem well:
One of the consequences of reliance on Le Gierse is that instead of
developing analyses of pooling, homogeneity, independence and vol-
ume, advocates of both the economic family and recharacterization
approaches are left with the bare words "risk distribution," which
mean nothing without further explanation and contextualization. This
problem was exacerbated in subsequent years when even the advo-
cates of the recharacterization approach appeared to reduce the issue
of defining an insurance operation to a computation of the amount of
unrelated risks covered by the captive.
20
4
Wholly aside from problems with the theoretical underpinnings of
risk shifting and the limited utility of current risk distribution assess-
ments, one can argue that both the two-test hurdle and the longstanding
hostility towards deductions for self-reserving activity have resulted in
an unhealthy concentration of risk (both predictable and dangerously
unpredictable) in large, long-established entities that still qualify as "in-
surance companies," even though a hefty chunk of their business consti-
tutes pure investment activity.
Shifting risk to an insurance company and having that risk distrib-
uted at the insurance company level may make good business sense for
certain companies in certain industries. However, in viewing the universe
of insurable risks more broadly, there is certainly room to consider ap-
proaches that promise better checks on risk concentration and thus, a
more effective balancing of traditional risk shifting/distributing and ra-
tional risk retention.
IV. PROPOSALS
Scholars have proposed various solutions to the captive insurance
company problem, such as focusing on the treatment of the captive and
requiring the captive to satisfy certain requirements in order for it to
201. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1992).
202. See Note, supra note 19, at 784 (emphasizing that "[t]he process of risk distribution ... is
the very essence of insurance").
203. Taylor, supra note 15, at 878-83.
204. Singer, supra note 15, at 140.
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qualify for special treatment-for example, proper risk-pooling, arms-
length pricing, and maintenance of a sufficient level of unrelated policy-
holder business.2 °5 Fortunately, and perhaps due to a degree of judicial
arm-twisting, some of those solutions are reflected in existing law. One
approach, for example, respects the captive arrangement if there exists
sufficient outside business at the captive level.2 6 Others see the solution
as a simple matter of weighing the business purpose of establishing the
207captive against any apparent tax avoidance purposes. Neither approach
is wholly satisfactory. The former fails to fully embrace the notion that
one company may have a sufficient volume of homogenous risk and
should have self-insuring options available without the participation of
an external, unrelated third-party insurer. The latter approach is encour-
aging but could benefit from the imposition of specific standards to en-
sure that self-insuring is truly feasible, and not merely a matter of suffi-
ciently weighty business purpose.
Thus, along those lines, the following discussion proposes contex-
tual self-insuring. To address the problem of concentrated risk and to
advance a simple utilitarian goal, this Article proposes the allowance of
current deductions for the creation of limited contingency reserves for a
specific subset of taxpayers.
A. Contextual Self-Insuring
The contextual self-insuring model seeks, at root, to allow compa-
nies with certain risks to self-insure through a related entity and deduct
the relevant "premiums," even if the arrangement would not satisfy the
Service's traditional risk shifting/distributing standard (such as a parent-
subsidiary arrangement). A company would qualify for contextual self-
insuring only if it could satisfy each of the following requirements:
(1) The arrangement involves an insurance risk and not merely an
investment risk;
(2) Either the company finds a captive arrangement financially ap-
pealing or the desired insurance is commercially unavailable,
available only at an exorbitant cost, or available at a cost sub-
stantially higher than the amount the company would have to
pay if self-insuring;
205. See, e.g., id. at 162-164.
206. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 972 F.2d at 863-64.
207. Winslow, supra note 15, at 135 (arguing that captive insurance arrangements should be
analyzed by weighing legitimate business purposes against tax avoidance purposes, rather than
attempting to ascertain whether insurance is "theoretically present"). Winslow has the same view
with respect to retrospectively rated insurance contracts. See Donald Arthur Winslow, A Note on
Retrospectively Rated Insurance and Federal Income Taxation, 79 KY. L.J. 195, 221-23 (1990)
(suggesting that a business purpose test might be a more useful means of ascertaining whether insur-
ance exists in a retrospectively rated contract). He notes that a retrospective insurance arrangement
allows an insurance company to share the cash flow advantages typical of self-insurance or captive
insurance company arrangements. See id. at 197.
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(3) The taxpayer has a sufficient number of homogenous, inde-
pendent risk units;
(4) There exists sufficient, reliable historical information regarding
the risk pool such that the law of large numbers can operate ef-
fectively; and
(5) The insuring entity will be adequately capitalized and operated
in accordance with the law of the captive's jurisdiction.
Companies unable to satisfy the foregoing would have the option of
forming a group captive or going the traditional route and seeking cover-
age from an insurance company in an arrangement currently sanctioned
by existing law. The proposal effectively allows individual companies
that are able to distribute their own risks internally to avoid the high cost
of obtaining that insurance from a third party, an alternative that is par-
ticularly appealing if the company is required to obtain the coverage.
Further, this approach allows those same companies to access reinsur-
ance markets directly, to the extent they feel reinsuring is appropriate,
and avoids many potential problems that might be encountered when
dealing with a third-party insurance company (such as resistance to claim
payment and unnecessary delay).
Contextual self-insuring is, of course, vulnerable to the argument
that allowing some companies to take deductions for self-insuring allows
distortion and substantial understatement of income, a result that is unfair
to other companies lacking the business profile or sheer size which
would allow them to take advantage of this elaborate form of contin-
gency reserving. There is also the potential charge that the eligibility
standards are weighed down by ambiguities, such as: What qualifies as
"exorbitant cost," when does a higher cost become "substantially
higher," and what qualifies as "reliable historical information?"
Fortunately, current and historical market data can point those in a
position to apply the standards in the right direction. Prevailing market
rates can easily sort out "exorbitant" costs, and neutral decision-makers
can readily assess the extent and quality of probability data to ascertain
whether it is reliable and useful in the relevant context. That being said, a
limited amount of ambiguity should not be fatal; applicable standards
should allow some degree of flexibility and room for healthy evolution
while, at the same time, retaining their immunity from easy manipula-
tion. To the extent that there are legitimate fears regarding income distor-
tion, there are a host of options with respect to reducing or minimizing
the apparent harm. For example, allowing deduction of only a percentage
of the premium, phasing in a full or partial deduction over a given time
period, and disallowing a premium deduction altogether once the insur-
ing company attains a certain financial profile.
While it remains true that only some companies will qualify for
contextual self-insuring, society cannot deny the differential treatment of
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various corporate taxpayers under current law, and should weigh the
harm inadvertently suffered by individual companies against the overall
health of the business sector and dangers of concentrated risk. Small
companies, no matter how limited their product or service line, have in-
surable risks. Thus, to the extent these companies choose to grow and
expand, they too may ultimately attain that critical mass of independent
risk units which would allow them to take advantage of contextual self-
insuring.
B. Utilitarian Contingency Reserving
The notion of utilitarian contingency reserving proposed here con-
sciously departs from any consideration of risk shifting, risk distributing,
or traditional notions of insurance. Rather, the core idea is that compa-
nies of a certain size-or those operating in certain industries-should,
as a matter of sound tax policy, and in accord with pursuit of the com-
mon good, be allowed to establish and take deductions for contributions
to a limited contingency reserve.
What industries and company sizes qualify? The question is tough
to answer but obviously depends on the extent lawmakers wish to make
available deductions for reserving. Whether broadly or narrowly tailored,
if a utilitarian justification is to have force, a qualifying company must
either be large enough such that a failure of the company or a sudden
financial challenge to it would negatively affect a substantial segment of
the U.S. economy (i.e., "too big to fail"), or be engaged in an industry in
which the ready availability of capital in an emergency (or even over the
long haul for crucial non-emergency activities) would maximize the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry, such as clean-up immediately
after an environmental disaster.
In any event, federally-endorsed reserving outside the insurance
arena is not a revolutionary notion. Since 1984, taxpayers operating nu-
clear power plants have been able to take deductions for contributions to
a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Fund ("NDRF" or "Fund"),2 °8 and
the tax rules and procedures governing NDRFs serve as an excellent
model for utilitarian reserving more generally.
Section §468A of the Code allows electing taxpayers to deduct
amounts contributed to a Fund during the taxable year,20 9 but limits the
annual contribution to a designated "Ruling Amount., 210 Determined by
208. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Adv. 2007-03-007 (Jan. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 121781 (concluding
that nuclear decommissioning cost is not an insurance risk and noting that "[t]he obligation to de-
commission has attached[,] therefore no hazard or fortuity as to the occurrence of decommissioning
exists.... Thus, no insurance risk is involved.").
209. I.R.C. § 468A(a) (2006).
210. Id. § 468A(b).
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an established schedule, 211 the Ruling Amount for each taxable year ba-
sically allows the taxpayer to contribute to the fund the total cost of de-
commissioning (but not more) over the estimated useful life of the power
212plant at a level-funding rate. On the flip side, the electing taxpayer
faces a gross income inclusion when amounts are distributed from the
213 214Fund213 or, barring regulatory exception, certain other events occur.
Assuming the amounts were distributed from the Fund and used to cover
actual decommissioning costs, 2 15 the gross income inclusion is offset by
a deduction for decommissioning expenses when economic performance
occurs.
2 16
Although Congress designed the rules set forth in §468A for nuclear
power plants facing definite decommissioning obligations, one could
readily argue that a similar system would be useful for risks that are
more contingent but financially radioactive, environmentally offensive,
or threatening in their own right. If, for example, Congress allows com-
panies to call on their contingency reserves (with an offsetting deduction
for designated expenditures) as the economy begins to slip into a reces-
sion (or a given company encounters exigent financial circumstances),
they may be able to delay or avoid layoffs, or take other steps to smooth
out the volatility of the short- and long-term business cycles. And, to the
extent that more large companies are able to bear their own risks, or at
least fine tune the balance of risks shifted and those retained, American
taxpayers will benefit as their shoulders are relieved of potential bailout
burdens.
If the recent past is any indicator, federal bailout infusions, granted
in exchange for an equity stake, exacerbate corporate agency costs. So,
rather than those costs being borne by the historic shareholder group
alone, those costs spread to the larger U.S. taxpaying population. It re-
mains true that as with contextual self-insuring, utilitarian reserving can
be attacked as allowing distortion and substantial understatement of in-
come. However, the core premise of utilitarian thought is that the larger
societal benefits outweigh individual harms.
211. Id. § 468A(d)(1). Although the Secretary is obligated to review the schedule of ruling
amounts during the useful life of the power plant (revising them if necessary), the Secretary may do
so more frequently if the taxpayer requests. Id. § 468A(d)(3).
212. Id. § 468A(d)(2)(A).
213. An exception applies with respect to amounts distributed from the Fund to cover certain
costs connected with Fund operations. Id. § 468A(c)(1)(A), (e)(4)(B).
214. These events include deemed distributions under § 468A(e)(6), terminations of the Fund
under § 468A(e)(7), and a disposition of any interest in the nuclear power plant. Id. § 468A(c)(I)(B).
215. The Fund can be used to cover decommissioning costs, to cover operational expenses, and
to the extent of amounts not needed for the foregoing, to make investments. Id. § 468A(e)(4). For
provisions governing the taxation of the Fund, see id. § 468A(e)(2).




In light of general judicial rejection and scholarly criticism, the
Service officially abandoned its economic family theory in the captive
insurance company arena in 2001. As promised, however, the Service
continues to analyze certain captive insurance transactions to ascertain
whether they incorporate risk shifting and risk distributing, despite the
fact that courts have questioned the legitimacy of a risk shifting inquiry
and thereby weakened its determinative force. Commentators do not
criticize the risk distribution requirement as inherently useless, but they
do accurately note that the standard can be used to demarcate true "insur-
ance" only in those contexts in which reliable probability data exists with
respect to the designated risk pool.
To the extent the Service or any other entity focuses only on the
mere existence of a large number of apparently independent, homoge-
nous risk units in the designated pool (with very little or no regard for
predictive data with respect to that pool), latent investment activity may
successfully cloak itself in the garb of "insurance." AIG's so-called "debt
insurance" on credit default swaps has brought home that truth and,
given the concentration of risk within behemoth AIG, that truth arrived
with resounding and devastating force.
Contextual self-insurance represents a healthy and viable means of
de-concentrating insurable risk generally, and for companies deemed
"too big to fail"--or those operating in certain industries-limited con-
tingency reserving is far more palatable than multi-billion-dollar bailouts
and the attendant enhancement of corporate agency costs. Indeed, both
contextual self-insuring and limited contingency reserving promise to
maximize the common good, whether measured on the national or indi-
vidual community scale.
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